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IN THE SUPREME CO,UR T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and JAMES F. TAY-
LOR, and UNITED PARK CITY )' 
MINES COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case 
No.10219 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES 
COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a silicosis claim under the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law (herein called the "0. D. Law'') 
for permanent total disability benefits. Defendant Unit-
ed Park City Mines Company (herein called ''defendant 
employer") and plaintiff are in dispute as to which of 
them has the obligation to pay whatever benefits defend-
ant James F. Taylor, (herein called "defendant Taylor") 
is entitled to receive. Defendant employer joins plain-
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tiff, however, in plaintiff's assertion that defendant Tay-
lor failed to file his claim within the period provided :by 
Section 35-2-48 U.C.A., 1953, the limitations of· actions 
statute. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Taylor was employed by defendant ·elh~ 
ployer as an underground miner for about 15 years be~ 
ginning in 1925. Thereafter (except for a two year hiatus 
between July, 1952 and October of 1954), he was eni~ 
ployed as a watchman on the surface from 1945 until 
June 30, 1961. He ret:urned to work, as a substitute for 
a sick watchman, for the period from February 3 through 
February 8, 1962. During that six days in February, 
he did exactly the same work he had done for twenty 
years before his 1961 separation from employment, and 
he was then exposed to the same dust conditions as had 
prevailed during his previous employment in surface 
activity (R-77, 79). Furthermore, he was as capable of 
the necessary physical exertion in February of 1962 as 
he had been the previous June. In February, he fired the 
boiler every day (R-80) and performed every other duty 
of a watchman. There was no appreciable change in his 
condition between July of 1961 and February of 1962 
(R-103) or, indeed, between the end of 1959 and the date 
of termination of his employment (R-81, 83, 103). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT TAYLOR FAILED TO FILE 
HIS SILICOSIS CLAIM WITHIN ONE YEAR 
AFTER HIS CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY, 
AROSE. 
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· .... Defendant employer fully concurs with plaintiff's 
argument under its Point I. Section 35-2-48 U.C.A., 1953, 
requires that a sili~osis claim be filed within one year 
after the cause arises. If the Court adopts the most lib-
eral view of when a cause of action arises, it must still, 
o.n the record in this case, p·erceive that defendant Tay-
lo~'s cause of action was mature and complete by the 
en~ of 1959, and he then knew or should have known of 
t~~ existence of every element of his cause of action : 
·:, 1. Defendant Taylor knew that he had silicosis. 
He testified (R-82) that Dr. Barta told him 
he had silicosis in 1933; Dr. Openshaw told 
him he was silicotic in 1943 or 1944 (R-82), 
and Dr. Oniki similarly diagnosed his con-
dition in 1952. 
2. Defendant Taylor knew he was disabled by the 
end of 1959. 
He testified about his disabling symptoms as 
follows (R-81) : 
"Q. And did that condition - shortness of 
breath, and tendency to fatigue - become 
worse, or was it a fairly static condition 1 
''A. It became worse at times. 
'' Q. As time went on, it became worse~ 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. Would you say that by the time you went to 
work for the Judge Daly Mine, .or the Daly 
Judge Mine, it had gotten about as bad as 
it. got 1 
''A. Well, it got a little worse after the last years 
there. 
3 
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'' Q. The last year or two f 
''A (nodding head in the affirmative.) 
"Q. But it was very difficult for you to carry on 
the work during the last, oh, from 1959 on; 
is that correct f" 
and {R-83): 
"Q. Why did you leave work on June 30th of 
1961f 
"A. I was laid off. 
"Q. Your condition at that time was about the 
same as it had been for a year or so pre-
viously; is that correct f 
"A. I'd say that, yes." 
3. Defendant knew that the cause of his symptoms 
was silicosis. 
He testified he had been told three times that 
he had silicosis, and his symptoms were the 
classic symptoms of silicosis - well known 
to all who live in hard rock mining commu-
nities. 
There is absolutely no evidence of any appreciable 
change in defendant Taylor's condition after 1959. The 
Panel has found that he is now totally disabled, and 
the members would undoubtedly have reached the same 
conclusion in 1959 by which time all his present symptoms 
had fully developed and he had suffered from silicosis for 
twenty-five years of which he was aware. We know 
(R-23, 30) that the Panel found no change in the lung 
condition between September 29, 1962, and !{arch 23, 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1963. Since the symptomatology had been static for 
several years, we must assume the disease process had 
been as static during those years as it was for the six 
months before March 23, 1963. 
We do not believe the mere fact defendant Taylor 
worked after 1959 demonstrates that he was not disabled 
or even totally disabled before that time. The Panel's 
conclusion of total disability is based upon the evidence 
of sufficient pathology (obviously present in this case by 
the· end of 1959) to contraindicate employment. The 
panel members do not conclude that Mr. Taylor's per-
formance of the duties of a watchman is now a physical 
impossibility, they merely conclude that any substantial 
physical exertion by him is medically unwise. 
POINT II. 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND MUST RE-
SPOND, IF COMPENSATION IS PAYABLE 
ON THIS CLAIM, AS THE COMPENSATION 
CARRIER FOR THE EMPLOYER AT THE 
TIME OF LAST EXPOSURE. 
The Commission found, with reference to the ex-
posure during February of 1962, as follows : 
'' * * * Under the principles enunciated in Pacific 
Employers Insurance Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 157 P. 2d Page 600, there must be 
a causal relation between the applicant's elisa-
bility due to silicosis and his employment during 
the policy period covered by The State Insurance 
Fund. Since we have found that the applicant was 
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide 
dust during the period between February 3, 1962, 
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and February 8, 1962, inclusive, the aforemen-
tioned case has been satisfied. Therefore, the appli-
cant is entitled to an award for total and permit~ 
nent disability due to silicosis against The State 
Insurance Fund.'' 
Plaintiff now contends it is an error of law for the. 
Commission to impose liability upon a carrier in a sili-
cosis case unless the carrier had been "on the risk" for 
a period of thirty days during which the employee was 
harmfully exposed to silicon dioxide dust. Plaintiff bases 
its contention on Section 35-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, and par-
ticularly the following language: 
'' * * * In the case of silicosis the only employer 
liable shall be the employer in whose employment 
the employeH was last injuriously exposed to the 
hazards of such disease, provided that in the case 
of silicosis the only employer liable shall be the 
employer in whose employment the employee was 
last exposed to harmful quantities of silicon diox-
ide (Si02) dust during a period of 30 days or more 
after the effective date of this act." 
Obviously, that language does not say anything about 
which of the two carriers, where there is a successor car-. 
rier during the period of exposure, must respond when 
an employee develops silicosis. Plaintiff asks this Court 
to read into the section enough additional language so 
that the protection it gives to employers is also extended 
to insurance companies. The language this Court would 
have to read into the section 'vould almost double its 
length. There is no precedent for such monumental judi-
ciallegisla tion. 
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The legislative purpose in making liable only the last 
employer during 30 days of harmful exposure is not evi-
dent from the words of the statute .or its legislative his-
tory. It cannot be assumed, however, that the legisla-
ture believed a 30 day exposure- would produce or signifi-
cantly effect the course of the disease.· If this Court can 
judicially notice any medical doctrine, it can take notice 
that the disease of silicosis develops only after years of 
exposure. The real purposes hoped to be accomplished 
by Section 35-2-14 were 
1. to encourage mining companies to eliminate dust 
from their mines within the statutory period 
(originally 60 days), and 
2. to eliminate the economic drain which would be-
entailed if a mining company had to wait until 
it had investigated the health of an applicant for 
employment before it could risk hiring him and 
putting him to work. 
Neither of these reasons has the slightest application 
to insurance carriers. To apply Section 35-2-14 to insur-
ance carriers would lead to a ridiculous result in any 
number of entirely probable situations. Suppose, for in-
stance, that an employer, then insured by a private car-
rier, employs a silicotic for the first time on November 
15~· He works underground in dusty environment for 
thirty consecutive days. On December 1, however, the 
employer's policy expires, and he then insures with the 
State Insurance Fund. The silicotic becomes disabled 
on December 16. Who, under the plaintiff's theory, must 
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respond~ Plaintiff apparently believes the employer 
should pay the benefits and the two insurance carriers 
should be entirely relieved of responsibility, even though 
the employer was always insured as the law requires and 
even if the employer were insolvent and unable to pay 
such benefits. 
The plaintiff cites the Deza case (Pacific Employers 
Ins. Co. v. Comm.ission, 108 Utah 123) as authority for 
the proposition we now criticize. We submit that the 
Deza case says plainly and without equivocation that the 
carrier who must respond (where there have been two 
or more carriers on the risk during the period of ex-
posure) is the one who insures the employer ''on. the 
date'' of last harmful exposure. On page 124, the Court 
makes this statement: 
''From the foregoing statement of facts, it is seen 
that the· last exposure to silicon dioxide dust was 
June 7, 1943. The significant importance of this 
date will become apparent immediately.'' (Our 
emphasis.) 
Again, on page 128, the Court says this : 
''As ha.s been pointed out, however, June 7, 1943, 
w·a~s the date of the la.st exposure of the applicant 
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust, and 
from that date until his employment ceased be-
cause of total disability on March 25, 1944, he con-
tinued in the employ of the Mines Company but in 
the capacity of a watchman above ground on the 
property of the Company. The insurance carrier 
at the time of such la.st exposure was the State In-
surance Fund; this is the date \Yhich fixes thelia-
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bility of the employer, and consequently also at-
taches the liability to the employer's insurance 
carrier as of that date.'' (Our emphasis.) 
Plaintiff cites the Deza case as being authority for 
the proposition that some causal relationship between 
exposure while a carrier is on the risk and the employer's 
disability must be shown if the carrier is to be held re-
sponsible. We submit that every day of an employee's 
exposure to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust is 
as significant in the total picture as every other day. The 
necessary causal relationship is shown by the mere fact 
that the exposure is to silicon dioxide dust and harmful. 
The reason the insurance carrier was exonerated in 
the Deza case was that the court clearly found that 
there was no harmful exposure while that carrier 
(Pacific Employers) was on the risk. In the instant case, 
the Commission has found that the exposure during seven 
days while plaintiff was on the risk was harmful. The 
carrier with the coverage for the employer who is liable 
on the date of the employee's last exposure in that em-
ployer's employment is, under the doctrine of the Deza. 
case, the carrier who must respond. In this case, that 
carrier was plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defenda.n.t 
United Pa.rk City Mines Co. 
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